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We present evidence about the effects of dismissals-for-cause requirements, a specific 
component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. We 
study a quasi-natural experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the 
12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for 
cause, eight did not apply to small firms. Using matched employer-employee 
longitudinal data and difference-in-differences methods, we examine the impact of 
that differentiated change in firing costs upon several variables over a long period of 
time. In our results, we do not find robust evidence of effects on job or worker flows, 
although some estimates suggest a slight increase in hirings. On the other hand, firms 
that gain flexibility in their dismissals exhibit consistently slower wage growth and 
sizeable increases in their relative performance. Our findings suggest that reducing 
firing costs of the type studied here increase workers' effort and reduce their 
bargaining power. 
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This paper has three aims: 1) to use Langlois’ framework of dynamic transaction costs to 
illustrate the coevolution of firm capabilities and the emergence of new markets for 
offshored and outsourced business services in China; 2) to use Coase’s institutional structure 
of production framework to analyse the influence of Chinese institutions on the 
organizational choices made in the offshoring and outsourcing of business services in China 
and 3) to link the two themes and understand the interaction between Chinese institutions 
and the emergence of markets and capabilities in business services in China. We use case 














The offshored and outsourced business services market has been developing rapidly as firms 
disintegrate both vertically and horizontally to focus on what they perceive to be their 
essential activities.  China has been a particular destination for these services and in the 
process of stripping them out of western manufacturing and services firms, the services have 
been reorganized into units that are thought to be more efficient modes of provision.  
Several questions concern us here in this paper:  What are the changes in the structure and 
characteristics of business services and the capabilities of firms and markets that have 
enabled the process of outsourcing and offshoring to occur?  What has been the influence of 
the institutional structure in China and its effect on organizational form: why have some 
firms adopted in-house offshoring whilst others are using specialist third party firms? And if 
firms are outsourcing as well as offshoring, why are some choosing local service providers 
and others international specialist firms?   To tackle these questions we use transaction cost 
theory and in particular the framework outlined by Langlois (1992, 2003) which in addition 
to considering the traditional Coasian/Williamsonian framework of contractual transaction 
and governance costs incorporates a dynamic view of the development of capabilities in 
both firms and markets. Langlois (1992) argues that it is the combination of both types of 
effects – transaction/governance costs and capabilities of firms and markets – that drive the 
decisions as to which activities to keep within the firm and which activities to buy in or 
outsource from other firms. This framework has been adopted and developed by Jacobides 
(2005) in looking at the vertical disintegration and emergence of markets in the mortgage 
banking sector. One aim of this paper is to develop Langlois’ ideas about dynamic 
transactions costs and the coevolution of capabilities in firms and markets and apply them to   4
the case of the offshoring and outsourcing of business services in China using case study and 
interview material collected on a variety of organizational types of service providers and 
clients.  
 
Our second aim is to understand how the institutional context in China affects the choice of 
organizational form. The framework of Coase’s ‘institutional structure of production’ (1992) 
has also been applied by Jacobides and Winter (2005) where they disentangle the coevolution 
of capabilities and transaction costs in explaining the institutional structure of production in 
both the mortgage banking industry in the US, which went from integration to 
disintegration, and the Swiss watch-manufacturing industry which went from disintegration 
to integration. Emphasis on the institutional structure of production is particularly relevant 
for offshored/outsourced services to China because it identifies the idiosyncratic nature of 
certain institutions in China – in particular property rights and relationships with the 
government -  that drive the choices of organizational form. For example  we argue that the 
choice of state-owned local providers for procurement tendering contracts is driven by the 
need to be close to government policy and procurement decision-making; the choice of in-
house offshoring for financial services has been driven by the weakness of data protection 
and poor protection of property rights; and the choices of state-owned local providers for 
human resource recruitment services or for procurement services are driven by the need for 
access to local government-owned personnel data and knowledge of local labour markets.  
 
Our final aim is to bring these two themes together to understand the interaction between 
Chinese institutions and their effect on the emergence of firms’ capabilities and new markets 
in outsourced and offshored business services. We use our case study and interview data to   5
place our examples of organizational choices on a grid that brings together the two 
dimensions of use of internal or external capabilities (adapted from Langlois 1992) alongside 
the institutional dimension characterised as degree of control through institutions over 
property rights and IPR in particular, access to information and data, and standardization of 
procedures.   
 
Section 1 outlines the framework of dynamic transactions costs and the coevolution of 
capabilities of firms and markets and its relationship to vertical disintegration. It also 
discusses the changing nature of business services as they are being outsourced and 
offshored and relates that to Sako’s (2005) distinction between vertical disintegration and 
corporate function unbundling.   Section 2 outlines details of our interviews and case studies 
and Section 3 draws out results from those case studies and interview material, illustrating 
the evolution of firms’ capabilities and the emergence of new specialist markets in these 
services and highlighting the relationship between perceptions of institutional idiosyncracies 
and choice of organizational form. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
Section 1 Coevolution of capabilities and transactions costs and the institutional 
structure of production – our framework 
 
We build on the traditional transaction cost framework as identified by Coase (1937) 
and developed by Williamson (1980) affecting the outsourcing decision of whether to make 
in-house or buy from a separate firm through the market. These costs focused on 
transaction costs of using the market  (buying in from other firms) in the presence of 
specialized assets, uncertainty and the scope for opportunistic behaviour giving rise to the   6
problem of hold-up between firms due to information asymmetries and the difficulties of 
specifying complete contracts particularly in situations which demanded relations over the 
longer term with changing demands. The original Chandler-Williamson solution to these 
hold-up dilemmas was to contain complex processes in-house and only to outsource those 
processes that could be more fully specified through contracts. Langlois (1992, 2004) argues 
that a major weakness of the Williamson approach is the assumption that at any point in 
time the choice exists for a firm between using the market or making components in-house. 
Williamson’s theoretical point that ‘In the beginning there were markets’ is historically not 
true; this is not an accurate representation of how new market sectors or industries emerge 
in terms of new firms coming into being that can provide the relevant products or services 
via the market. 
 
Langlois introduces the idea of ‘dynamic transactions costs’.  Firms’ capabilities change over 
time and markets learn, which are reflected in the costs of transferring the firm’s capability to 
the market and vice versa. These dynamic transactions costs are the costs of persuading, 
negotiating, coordinating with and teaching others in the face of technological and 
organizational change.  It may sometimes be costly to create within firm capabilities that are 
available on the market, and vice versa. Langlois defines these dynamic governance or 
transactions costs as the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them.   
He uses the example of Ford having to make parts in-house as market alternatives did not 
exist: mass production required different inputs and changes in the production process. 
Existing suppliers were generalists using batch techniques; the new processes were mass 
production ones.  It was less costly for Ford to make parts than to teach suppliers who were 
ill equipped to understand what Ford required. Indeed Ford was not in a position to know   7
what to teach them; its invention of moving assembly lines for different parts was a process 
of capability building and trial and error learning. Over time, other firms’ capabilities 
developed, allowing processes to be outsourced. Langlois points to three factors that tend 
towards the emergence of new markets. First, the pattern of existing capabilities in the firm 
and market may be inappropriate as a division of labour for new requirements, either 
through being widely distributed among firms and other organizations in ways that require a 
reconfiguration of those capabilities, or through being contained within the boundaries of 
large firms which are slow to adapt and reconfigure existing capabilities to new 
opportunities.  Second, the nature of the economic change or technological development 
may lead to new profitable opportunities that require the reorganization of capabilities; and 
third, the market-supporting institutions, such as standards, may not exist and need to be 
created from scratch (Langlois 2004).  Jacobides (2005) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) 
emphasize the intertwining of the evolution of capabilities, specialization by firms and the 
transactions costs that they face: they argue that for vertical disintegration and vertical 
specialization to occur there need to be differences in capabilities along the value chain and 
that transaction costs coevolve with specialization if those differences in capabilities exist. 
The shaping of vertical scope (the part of the value chain each firm specializes in) over time 
is driven by a selection process, itself driven by capability differences, and transaction costs 
are changed by those firms in their efforts to reshape the transactional environment. In turn 
these changes in vertical scope affect the development of their capabilities over time, and 
changes in firms’ capabilities affect industry capabilities ie how many firms participate and 
compete in this industry. 
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In general Jacobides (2005) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) argue that there need to be 
gains from specialization through different managerial styles or knowledge bases in different 
parts of the value chain and capability differences between different firms. The value chain at 
the industry level needs to be partitioned into separable activities and capabilities and 
coordination between nodes of the value chain needs to be simplified with a reduction in 
their interdependence, a standardization of information and its codification so that it can be 
transacted between independent organizations. In the case of the emergence of the US 
mortgage market, the government gave it a kick-start in providing a template organization 
for a mortgage-backed security in creating the Fannie Mae. The laying off of loan origination 
staff in the recession of the mid 1970s played its part; they were then rehired at first on a 
temporary basis when business picked up but as independent operators with the relevant and 
known capabilities.  
 
Business services are an interesting case to study. They are particularly affected by IT and the 
digitalization of information. This has transformed services so that the data or information 
part of them can be made more standardized and routine. This also has meant that they can 
be depersonalized and dealt with via routines at a distance rather than through person to 
person dealings. This means they can be both part of a vertical disintegration process and 
outsourced to an outside firm and/or located offshore as geographical distance in terms of 
direct contact between producer and consumer has lessened in importance. 
 
Sako (2005) makes the distinction in the case of business services between vertical 
disintegration and corporate function unbundling, applying this to the types of services that 
have been outsourced in the early 21
st century. Corporate function unbundling draws on   9
Stigler’s concept (1951) of general specialities such as railroads and shipping which apply 
across all industries. Sako draws out three distinctions between vertical disintegration and 
corporate function unbundling: 1) With vertical disintegration suppliers make inputs that go 
into clients’ final products or services whereas with corporate function unbundling suppliers 
provide services in corporate functions such as Finance, Human Resources Management, 
Marketing or Purchasing. 2) With vertical disintegration upgrading or moving up the supply 
chain may involve an invasive strategy of competing in the same market as client firms; with 
corporate function unbundling upgrading involves a deepening of functional expertise which 
operates in a different market from the client firms’ final market. 3) Related to this, with 
vertical disintegration the possibility of a bilateral monopoly is there with suppliers engaging 
in hold-up and buyers exercising monopsonistic power; whereas with corporate function 
unbundling client firms are in a weak position with no monopsonistic power vis a vis 
suppliers.    
 
This relates to thinking about business services and their increased outsourcing and 
offshoring in the early part of this century because segments of the value chain relating to 
generic business services in a variety of areas have been redefined as separable segments 
requiring discrete capabilities and therefore able to be hived off from the core activities of 
many manufacturing and financial firms. These services have been general specialities which 
are used across the whole company and also apply across all industries. They are divided into 
IT-related services such as software development, management of IT infrastructure, network 
and desktop services, and Business Process Outsourcing and Offshored services such as 
Human Resource Management, Procurement, Logistics, and Management of financial and   10
accounting data. Thus specialized firms such as IBM and EDS are significant players in the 
provision of data processing services in this new segment of business services. 
 
The other set of interacting influences on the organization of service provision, in particular 
in offshore locations in emerging markets, are those of the institutional environment in those 
countries. Coase (1992) introduced the idea of the ‘institutional structure of production’ 
whereby in a general sense the institutional environment, namely the strength of property 
rights, the transparency of and access to information, the nature of corruption or privileged 
access by groups to information or skills would all in general affect the way in which 
production is organized. The emphasis on institutions especially in emerging markets has 
come to the fore in recent literature.  ‘Good’ institutions means clear and transparent 
property rights, clear contract enforcement upheld by the legal system, independence of the 
judiciary from the executive, a low level of bureaucracy and regulation and an accompanying 
low level of opportunity for corruption (Estrin and Prevezer 2008).  The absence of these 
features of ‘good’ institutions in China, namely unclear property rights, unenforced or 
unenforceable contracts, lack of transparency in government contracts, lack of independence 
of the judiciary and opportunity for corruption in the enforcement of regulation, makes the 
influence of the institutional environment on organizational choice pronounced and was 
highlighted in interviews as one of the factors relevant in making such organizational 
choices.  
 
Finally we bring these two themes together in showing how the interaction of the 
institutional environment with the emergence of firms’ and markets’ capabilities interact to 
produce a particular form of choices that firms are making in the outsourcing and offshoring   11
of their business services in China. We use an adaptation of Langlois (1992) which suggests 
how the evolution of outsourcing of activities emerges as firms’ capabilities develop, overlaid 
with a picture of  how organizational choices between in-house and outsourced provision are 
likely to be affected as the institutional environment moves towards western standards. 
 
To summarise, the questions that this paper is addressing are 1) the coevolution of 
capabilities and transaction costs: how are these markets evolving in China in terms of the 
relationship between firms’ capabilities and transactions costs and the emergence of 
specialized markets?  In the context of Chinese service provision, is this vertical 
disintegration or corporate unbundling ie what kinds of services and what functions are 
being outsourced and offshored? 2) How much does organizational choice in China have to 
do with the particularities of Chinese institutions and adaptation to those institutions?  3) 
How do these two forces interact to produce the particular organizational choices that have 
been taken, and how are they likely to evolve in the near future as the institutional 
environment adapts alongside the emergence of indigenous firms’ capabilities to challenge 
the existing capabilities of western firms in this arena of business services. 
 
Section 3  Methods 
We use a mix of case studies and interviews with different organizational types of providers.  
We have three IT outsourcing case studies: Procter and Gamble to Hewlett Packard, Dupont 
to CSC and China Netcom (CNC) to Huapu. And we have four BPO vendor case studies – 
of China Data Group, PG Logistics Group, Neusoft Park Industrial Development and Dairy 
Farm to Capgemini – all drawn from various IDC and Gartner consultancy reports. Details 
of our interviews are listed in Table 1. They are with a number of different types of service   12
provider and clients including Schneider Electric, HSBC Data Processing, Shanghai Oriental 
International Group, Bearing Point, Hewlett-Packard, Accenture, Motorola, Hehao Info, Su 
Teng Technology and Microsoft.  This kind of material is required in order to unravel a 
number of issues for which detailed information on a case by case basis is required. It gives 
us a number of measures that can be related to the capabilities of firms and markets – details 
on the kinds of skills within the firms, the types of services that are being done, the changes 
in those services over time as capabilities increase, the nature of the contracts with providers 
and the types of monitoring that accompany the contracts. Specific questions were asked in 
the interviews relating to perceptions of institutional weakness and how that affected choice 
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Section 4 Results 
 






















Figure 1 illustrates the various routes to offshoring and outsourcing that occured in the 
process of offshoring of business services to China, taken from our case studies and 
interviews. Route 1 highlights the important role that foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
manufacturing has played; here manufacturing processes were offshored through FDI to 
China, and subsequently business services from those manufacturing subsidiaries were 
outsourced within China either to third party global firms’ subsidiaries in China or to third 
party domestic firms. An example of this is in one of our case studies of the contract 
Foreign client firms –
US, UK, Japan, Korea
FDI in China  (manufacturing, 
financial services, utilities)
Offshore manufacturing
Offshore services to captives






























between Procter and Gamble China with Hewlett Packard China. Route 2 is the case where 
business services are outsourced from an FDI subsidiary in China to a third party local 
vendor; such an example is of GE China outsourcing to FESCO, or Motorola Wireless 
Division to Su Teng Technology. Route 3 is where there is offshoring (but no outsourcing) 
of business services, directly from the client to a captive subsidiary in China; examples of this 
are HSBC to their subsidiary, or Microsoft to theirs. Route 4  is where there is offshoring 
and outsourcing of business services, directly from the client to global third party subsidiary 
firms such as BearingPoint China or Hewlett Packard China. Route 5 is offshoring and 
outsourcing services to a third party local firm. And Route 6 is where there is outsourcing 
(but no offshoring) from a local client firm, such as China Netcom to a local vendor firm or 
Huawei to Kehao.  
 
Results from case study and interview material:   
1)Coevolution of firms’ capabilities and the evolution of markets 
What kinds of capabilities have firms had to have for these markets to emerge? Markets have 
emerged in IT-based services out of the capabilities of IT firms in the computer industry. 
This process has drawn on the capabilities of IT firms that have existed in the computer 
industry, for example Hewlett Packard and IBM which possess  the data processing 
capabilities that are relevant for the management of these generic services. In our case 
studies  Procter and Gamble (P&G) outsourced their IT infrastructure to Hewlett Packard 
(HP) in 2003, giving as reasons the lower IT costs and better service level resulting from this 
specialization. P&G have restructured their regional services with one IT centre, provided by 
HP, to service other P&G subsidiaries in the Asia Pacific region. Dupont have a similar 
arrangement with CSC: they outsourced their call centre, desktop and server management in   15
15 countries in the Asia Pacific region. They are achieving cost reductions through the scale 
and scope economies of this corporate function unbundling throughout the region.  
 
What kinds of markets are these new markets?  This is relational contracting, not an arms’ 
length market: these are very long and large contracts. For example P&G’s contract in 2003 
with HP was a $3bn contract for 10 years. Dupont’s contract with CSC in 2003 was similarly 
long-term and large with very careful selection procedures, long transition process, and a 
high degree of monitoring and communication. P&G’s contract followed on from joint 
ventures and subsidiaries in China for P&G since 1998. The IT departments have acted as a 
bridge between the internal users and external providers. There is specialization and more 
formal monitoring owing to clearer processes and management systems. There is also a huge 
amount of coordination and communication required between the two firms. In the case of 
China Netcom CNC outsourcing to Huapu Information Technology, the 3 year contract for 
the help desk and call centre has consolidated the management of IT with better monitoring 
through the Service Level Agreements. 
 
The extent of cospecialization with specialized capabilities for parts of the value chain differs 
for segments of the market; there are many small software firms that provide relatively 
standardized services so there is a thick market in that segment. Coordination along the 
supply chain is simplified, task interdependence reduced and information is more 
standardized. Whereas for higher value added services,  more customized IT consulting and 
design of IT infrastructure is done by specialized firms, typically western firms performing to 
higher standards. Our case studies of Dupont outsourcing its IT function to CSC, P&G to 
HP or China Netcom to Huapu are examples of specialist provider firms where all IT   16
functions are consolidated within that firm and are serving all the local (Asia Pacific) 
subsidiaries of the client firm.   
 
There are various niche markets in services within this sector, with a distinction between 
Western specialist firms and local providers in terms of their capabilities and therefore what 
they provide. Western specialist firms tend to provide certain services and processes higher 
up the value chain and local providers specialize in more routine processes. Western firms’ 
advantages lie in superior standardized management processes and quality control. This 
division between the routine service and services that are more sensitive or core to the client 
firm can also be one between those services that are kept in-house and those that are 
outsourced to the local provider. There are exceptions to this: some local providers such as 
Su Teng Technology may be used for higher grade design work for their client Motorola, but 
this is done through exclusive relationships between the client firm and service provider: 
  “Su Teng Technology has very tight cooperation with Motorola Wireless Solution Division. The 
reason that Motorola outsources its solution development to Su Teng is that according to Ms Yin, the 
development cost and coordination cost are higher if Motorola keep this in-house. Su Teng works with 
Motorola to get orders from clients (eg Su Teng design solutions make demos etc). But to the clients, 
Motorola is the only vendor they are facing. And Su Teng never appears independently before clients”. 
Interview with Ms Yin, Su Teng Technology 
 
The lower-value more routine work may be outsourced (subcontracted) further down the 
chain but the local outsourcers are chosen through their being known to the outsourcing 
firm, as reliable local markets for this kind of service provision do not yet exist: 
 
  “Su Teng outsources coding work to other companies. Normally they will divide the coding job into 
pieces to different outsourcers to avoid the software being pirated. Su Teng choosing outsourcer mainly 
depends on internal referral. According to Ms Yin, internal referral can assure they find skilled persons 
they can deliver high quality work while even a outsourcer has certificates like CMMI can not assure the 
people that the outsourcer assigns to work for Su Teng is qualified”. Interview with Ms Yin, Su Teng 
Technology 
   17
There is also a domestic outsourcing services market for instance in software development. 
For example Kehao provides software development services to Huawei, China’s largest 
telecom equipment manufacturer (Route 6 in Figure 2).  
  “There are two ways that they provide outsourcing service to Huawei…The first one is that their 
people work in Huawei…Huawei is responsible for the people and work arrangement, project 
management and evaluation. While Kehao side is mainly in charge of their people training and 
performance evaluation. Another one is that Huawei send its requirements to Kehao and Kehao 
organizes their people to do software development in their own office. Huawei will review the project 
periodically to assure the delivers meeting its needs” Interview with Mr Yu, Kehao February 20 2006 
 
The choice of outsourcing services rather than keeping them in-house here has to do with 
greater efficiency in specialization between the firms, alongside close contact and monitoring 
by the client firm of its provider of software development in this case. 
 
How have these markets evolved?  The path to outsourcing of business services has been in 
many cases via the client companies’ prior experience of FDI in China. Thus in the case of 
Procter and Gamble outsourcing its IT infrastructure to Hewlett Packard,  this followed 
from P&G’s experience of joint ventures and subsidiaries in China since 1988 – in 
Guangzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu and Tianjin with investments of over $1bn and 
over 4000 staff in P&G China. In similar fashion Dupont’s outsourcing of services to CSC 
was the culmination of FDI in China of $700m since the mid 1980s with 24 subsidiaries or 
joint ventures and over 3000 employees.   
 
It was also noted that standards and certification – CMM certification in particular – have 
played a role in establishing adherence to management procedures. There is much less CMM 
certification in China than India. One of the main differences between western specialist 
firms and indigenous ones is seen in terms of adherence to standardized procedures.   18
How have capabilities evolved or been developed within firms? There has been a process of 
capabilities in firms developing, with firms starting off with low value added, standardized, 
routine services such as data coding, developing their management capabilities and then 
increasing the range of services they supply as they move upstream. This is similar to the 
process that has occurred for Indian companies in their services provision (Athreye 2005)  
 Examples of such upgrading where the company’s capabilities are increasing and they are 
taking on more service provision in our sample are of the PG Logistics Group and Bearing 
Point.  In addition in financial services outsourcing has progressed from initially dealing with 
routine data processing but over time involving more confidential and complex processes. 
  “HSBC has two Data Processing Centres in China. One is in Guangzhou, which is established in 
1996 and provided simple data processing service at its early stage. Gradually, its business has expanded to 
credit card authorizing, central data support and customer hotline service and mainly focused on Asia Pacific 
market and part of EU and North American market. The other one is HSBC Data Processing 
(Shanghai), a wholly owned subsidiary of HSBC Group. It was established in Shanghai in March 2002 
and provides operation support to banking and financial transactions taking place across the Asia Pacific 
countries and UK. The staff number is rapidly increasing to about 1200” Inverview with anonymous former 
HSBC Data Processing (Shanghai) employee. 
 
Another example of the division of service provision between in-house subsidiaries and 
outsourcers comes from Motorola. Small local providers are used for more routine coding 
work, whereas more sensitive and larger-scale software projects are kept in-house. 
  “In his division, they [Motorola] outsource software development to local outsourcers. During the 
cooperation, the Motorola is responsible for software design and testing while the outsourcers are only 
responsible for coding. The Motorola provides the outsourcers with software design documents. And the 
outsourcers develop software according to such documents. Since coding work is straight forward and the 
testing (testing software whether work properly or not) is done by Motorola itself, Motorola doesn’t need to 
pay too much attention to quality control. Normally, they outsource small and middle scale software 
development to the third parties and keep the large scale software development in house. Normally they will 
choose local SMEs as their vendors. For one reason, compared with large companies, SMEs have competitive 
edge at cost. For the other reason, normally it will take longer time to do business with larger companies than 
SMEs.” Interview with Mr Ji, Manager, Motorola, January 21 2006 
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 A final feature that our interviews highlighted was the prevalence of working in teams with 
people from the service provider going to work on-site at the client’s workplace. This is also 
a feature of the Indian offshoring market and has been thought to be related to the 
difficulties in transferring tacit, sticky knowledge with system dependence across long 
distances. The interesting difference in this Chinese context is that the geographical distances 
are not far in that both parties are usually subsidiaries based in China, and sometimes in the 
same city. However the need for having people from both firms working together at the 
client’s site, to understand client needs better and what their routines are, is not in this case a 
function of geographical distance but of distance between firms in terms of their routines 
and operational culture and is testament to the tacitness and stickiness of this operational 
knowledge. This is the case for instance in the example cited between Kehao and Huawei 
above. It is also the case for Accenture employees working with MNC clients: 
  “These employees currently work on an outsourcing project. They provide IT service including 
application development for a MNC subsidiary in China, which is part of the contract signed between the 
MNC and Accenture globally. These people work in the MNC just as the MNC’s employees. They have 
the MNC’s employee badge, email account, extension number etc. They work under the client working policy 
and rarely return to Accenture, so as to their leader have to remind them they are Accenture’s employees not 
the client’s employees. According to the contract, they will work in the MNC for another few years.” 
Interview with Employees in Accenture, China 
 
It appears that in these project teams, part of the function of the service provider is to train 
the client employees. 
“In this project, the client’s employees together with Accenture’s employees compose project teams. 
Currently the ratio between client people and Accenture is around 1:3 but gradually the Accenture people will 
dominate the number. The purpose that these clients’ employees join the project is to be familiar with the 
system they will use later in their daily work.”Interview with Employees in Accenture, China 
 
Further examples of this kind of project team-working across the firms exist between 
BearingPoint and its clients and between Hewlett Packard and Schneider Electric: 
  “The BearingPoint may do like this: a consultant, a salesman and an engineer visit client to 
understand client’s requirments…After the client making decision, BearingPoint will set up a project team or   20
send its people to work on client sites” Interview with Mr Huang, Global Development Center, BearingPoint 
China 
 
An interesting feature of these working arrangements is that through internal IT monitoring 
systems (especially within the specialist global providers) the service provider firm is able to 
monitor its employees remotely whilst they are working onsite at the client’s workplace. This 
combines a lowering of monitoring costs, owing to sophistication in IT processes, which 
enables firms to retain control over their workers whilst they are not physically based within 
the firm, with a lowering of the costs of dealing with tacit knowledge that demands that 
people work, or train others to work, across firms on processes within the same workplace. 
 
  “HP field service engineers stay in Schneider and work under Schneider’s policy. Schneider has the 
right to adjust HP employees’ job responsibility but will inform HP’s project manager. HP’s project manager 
communicates with Schneider side manager periodically. Schneider IT people mainly responsible for 
management, purchasing, resource allocation etc while HP people mainly focus on technical job assignment. 
There are only 4-5 people in Schneider’s IT department in East China region and they are in charge of more 
than 10 factories or subsidiaries’ IT management with the region. And they have to rotate among these 
branches. Compared with the amount of people in Schneider IT department, 6-7 HP people serve Schneider 
Shanghai….Thanks to HP’s IT system, the performance of HP employee on client site can be monitored by 
the HP. The system will record every case an HP employee proceed and so can evaluate his/her job 
assignments. Also an HP employee on client site has to log on to the system to report his/her working time. 
Of course, the client manager will give his/her comments on HP people’s performance to HP manager.” 
 
The organizational boundaries of the two firms are not determined physically by employees 
of each firm remaining within the physical location of that firm. Instead, the span of control 
extends from the service provider into the partner (client) firm whilst enabling the tacitness 
or stickiness of knowledge transfer to be accomodated through physically working together 




2) Effect of institutions in China on organizational choice   21
The effect of institutions on organizational choice is manifested in various ways: 1) through 
the need to use state-owned companies in order to have access to government data;  2) to 
penetrate the regulatory environment by using local providers which arises from regulatory 
restrictions and government requirements for local provision; 3) relatively weak IPR leads to 
use of western specialist firms or captive service providers for processes involving 
confidential and proprietary data. 
1) Use of state-owned companies as providers for their relations with government and access to personnel data 
 Various ways of dealing with institutional lack of transparency occur through linkages with 
government and state-owned companies as mediators through the bureaucracy.  From the 
client perspective:  
“The top reason they choose a local service provider is that FESCO as a state-owned company keeps 
good relationship with local government such as the Labor Bureau, the Social Insurance Bureau and the 
Personnel Bureau, enabling it to understand the local policy and trend…For example if a company 
wants to investigate its candidate’s background, a reliable information source is the personnel file archived 
in the Personnel Bureau. Due to the connection with the local government, it is relatively easy for 
FESCO to access such resource” Interview with Lilian Li, Schneider Electric HR Specialist, former 
GE Specialist Material HR specialist 
 
Thus the use of FESCO for Human Resource services, especially for recruitment by GE and 
Schneider was done for the state-owned company’s knowledge of personnel data and access 
to them, and for its inside knowledge of the local labour markets and ability to screen in 
recruitment processes. This kind of inside knowledge would not be available to foreign 
providers, nor to private companies and illustrates the lack of transparency in these 
institutional procedures. 
 
Similarly Microsoft did not hire people directly when it first entered the Chinese market. 
Instead it recruited people  through a local company named Worksoft, which provided   22
people to work at one of Microsoft’s China branches, and it operated through a joint venture 
with the Shanghai Government, Wicresoft. 
  “After delivering a qualified local project and a global project, Microsoft gave this branch headcounts 
and the former Worksoft employees were transferred to the Microsoft” Interview with Mr Chen Yuyang, 
MSN Technologies China, a division of Microsoft, April 7 2006 
 
2) Nature of regulatory environment 
Likewise in BPO procurement, institutional costs are significant and it is easier to use local 
indigenous and state-owned companies as providers, particularly where the clients are local 
government or are state-owned themselves. The nature of the regulatory environment and 
local knowledge of approval procedures appears to be important in this context and requires 
the use of local providers who are well-connected with state institutions. 
  “According to the Chinese regulation, any government procurement (eg public funded hospital 
purchasing medical equipment) over a threshold (depending on local government’s regulation) and certain 
kinds of goods’ importing must be processed via tendering. Only authorized companies can provide tendering 
service. …The role played by the Oriental International can be described as follows…According to its client’s 
requirements, Oriental Internatioanl prepares the tendering documents. During this process the staff of 
Oriental International work with its clients to ensure all the documents are not against laws and 
regulations…After this the Oriental International will submit the tendering documents to local government to 
get approval…If the tendering documents passed by the government, Oriental International will sell them to 
vendors so that they can compete for the bid. Then the Oriental International will arrange the whole bidding 
process. Good relationship with the local government is very important. This can explained in two fold. The 
first fold is that the lcoal government is its client. The second fold is that the Oriental International can 
facilitate the approval procedure by keeping good relationship with the government and therefore better serve its 
clients.” Interview with Vivan Li, Project Specialist, Shanghai Oriental International Group 
 
Another reason for using local providers is in part due to regulatory restrictions.  
   “Government regulation sometimes may bring business opportunities to China Telecom. An 
example is that a MNC outsourced its network service to four foreign companies AT&T, BT, Equant and 
SingTel. But none of these four outsourcers have operation license in China. Therefore part of service has to be 
outsourced to the local carrier China Telecom. This causes inefficiency in operation. Under this situation, the 
MNC wants a local carrier to handle all of its network service in China.” From proposal of China 
Telecom/Guandong providing service to CSPC Huizhou. 
 
3) Weak IPR leads to use of global specialists or keeping services in-house   23
However for some processes which involve confidential data, these companies will choose 
global specialists for their more stringent control of intellectual property. 
  “For some key HR process such as payroll process, foreign companies are more likely to choose 
multinational specialist HR outsourcing companies than the local ones because of worrying [about] the 
confidential data leakage.” Interview with Lilian Li Schneider Electric 
 
The use of captive subsidiaries for direct offshoring and outsourcing of services (Route 3) is 
another way of dealing with poor institutional structures, especially weak IPR. 
  “In the interviewee’s opinion, the critical reason for HSBC to keep their outsourcing [sic] in-house 
is worrying [about] the leakages of information which is highly sensitive.. A company’s policy well reflects the 




3) Interrelationship between institutions, internal and external capabilities of firms 
and markets and organizational choices 
 
 





Adapted from Langlois 1992 
 
External capabilities of markets Internal capabilities of firms
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Delta C cost 
premium for doing 
things internally – if 
negative internal, if 
positive external 
Low control over and 
poor access to 
information, poor IPR   24
 
Figure 2 outlines how we think the relationship works of the effect of institutions on the 
emergence of capabilities either creating new markets or within firms. Adapting Langlois 
1992, there is a per-unit cost premium for doing activities internally within the firm. If that 
premium is negative, there is a cost advantage to internal organization and the firm will 
choose to keep those activities in-house; if the cost premium is positive, there is a 
disadvantage to the firm to keeping activities in-house and it will choose to outsource them 
and use the capabilities of markets. Those activities to the right of point A will be done 
through external markets whilst those to the left of point A will be undertaken within the 
firm. On the vertical axis we describe the effects of the institutional environment: ‘good 
institutions’ translates into better control over and more transparent access to information, 
data, procedures, IPR whereas poor institutions means weaker property rights, lack of 
transparency in procedures such as contracts, poor access to information. Different 
organizational choices are situated in the various quadrants. Firms such as Microsoft and 
Motorola preferred to retain processes in-house where there was less risk of leakage of 
confidential information. Western firms such as Hewlett Packard, Accenture or Bearing 
Point are in the top right-hand quadrant: they had a cost advantage for providing services 
over firms keeping them in-house. They also demonstrated superior control through their 
own internal procedures. State-owned firms such as FESCO are also in this quadrant with 
their advantage being their access to state-controlled information such as personnel data 
which outside (non-Chinese or private) firms would not be able to retrieve. Smaller 
indigenous firms would be placed in the lower right hand quadrant, with outsourcing to 
them driven by their specialization and cost advantage but confined to more routine types of 
activities which would be more easily monitored where leaky information or non-standard   25
procedures would be less damaging. Over time, as more firms specializing in these activities 
emerge and as control over IPR and access to information improves and diffuses, one would 
expect the line delineating the division between external and internal activities to move 
leftwards and upwards and more organizational choices of firms to fall within the top-right 
quadrant. 
 
Section 5 Conclusions 
 
Since the mid-1990s there has been a marked deverticalization of industrial structures with 
vertical specialization between different firms – an unmaking of the Chandlerian revolution 
(Langlois 2003). In particular with business services, this deverticalization has stripped out 
what Stigler called general specialties and Sako called corporate function unbundling – 
services which can be dealt with through capabilities in IT where previously they required 
person to person contact and were coordinated through departments within companies. 
These services include human resource management services such as recruitment, 
procurement services, accounting and finance services, logistics services as well as directly 
IT-related services to do with managing the IT infrastructure, networks and software within 
companies. 
 
This paper has been linking together the Langlois (1992, 2003, 2004) framework of how 
markets and firms’ capabilities coevolve alongside Coase’s ideas (1992) of the institutional 
structure of production and how the institutional framework influences the organizational 
structures of production in the context of a case study of the emergence of offshored and 
outsourced markets for business services in China. Out of our interviews and case study   26
examples illustrating the process, over a period of 10 years from mid-1990s to 2005,  these 
markets in offshored and outsourced services and the firm capabilities that go with it have 
emerged in specific organizational forms. We highlight some features of these organizational 
choices, how the markets and capabilities have evolved and how the institutional 
environment in specific ways has shaped those organizational choices. 
 
The markets that emerged in these services have drawn on IT-based capabilities that in the 
initial phases have existed in data-processing and consultancy firms such as Hewlett Packard, 
IBM, Accenture and Bearing Point. The choice of global specialists such as Hewlett Packard 
or BearingPoint, which are present locally in China rather than local indigenous third party 
providers involves, is due to their greater efficiency and deeper firm capabilities especially in 
management procedures. The advantages that such firms have had over the newly emerging 
indigenous firms in China have been their adherence to standardized processes and their 
ability to undertake tasks higher up the value chain than the more routine standardized 
processes which formed the original impetus for the outsourcing of these services.   
 
In interviews examples were given of choosing global specialists to deal with payroll issues, 
due to the dangers of data leakage and confidentiality, as western providers were thought to 
be safer. The greater capabilities of global specialists such as Accenture were mentioned and 
their ability to develop more customized services on top of the more standard HR systems. 
It is also possible that these western firms constitute an oasis of institutional norms of the 
western business environment, for instance over contract enforcement, and therefore lower 
institutional costs, in a desert of more idiosyncratic emerging market institutions.  
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Institutional costs are important in China and ways of dealing with them occur through 
linkages with the government and state-owned companies as mediators through the 
bureaucracy. Thus the use of FESCO for Human Resource services, especially for 
recruitment by GE was done for the state-owned company’s knowledge of personnel data 
and access to them, and for its inside knowledge of the local labour markets and ability to 
screen in recruitment processes. This kind of inside knowledge would not be available as 
readily to foreign providers, nor to private companies and illustrates the lack of transparency 
in these institutional procedures. Likewise in BPO procurement, institutional costs are 
significant and it becomes easier to use local indigenous and state-owned companies as 
providers, particularly where the clients are local government or are state-owned themselves. 
The nature of the regulatory environment and local knowledge of approval procedures 
appears to be important in this context and requires the use of local providers who are well-
connected with state institutions. 
 
The use of captives ie in-house service provision appears to occur in the financial sector, see 
our example of HSBC, with concerns expressed in this sector about security and leakages of 
confidential and sensitive information. The weakness of firm-level intellectual property 
protection makes firms in this sector tend towards in-house provision of services especially 
where proprietary information is concerned. Control and monitoring procedures are thought 
to be more effective using in-house procedures than when outsourcing to a third party. This 
would appear to be the result of a mix of institutional costs, with weaker IPR in China than 
the west and firm-specific capabilities leading firms to keep service provision in-house. 
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We have also highlighted the interaction between the evolution of markets and capabilities 
with the effects of institutional costs on the organizational choices that have been made in 
this sector. Particular organizational choices – of state-owned firms such as FESCO for 
procurement or for HR purposes, or of western specialist services firms such as Bearing 
Point or Accenture – are driven by the combination and interaction of the particular superior 
capabilities of those firms alongside their function of compensating for particular 
institutional weaknesses or idiosyncracies in China. So the choice of the state-owned firm 
allows access to government-held data or plans for procurement not available to the outside 
firm; the choice of western specialist provider gives greater assurance over use of 
standardized procedures and security of proprietary information. As greater control over 
proprietary information and greater transparency of information diffuses to greater numbers 
of indigenous firms, and as the capabilities in indigenous firms are extended up the value 
chain, one will expect to see a thicker market developing in the provision of these services 
composed of greater numbers of Chinese providers, and in terms of our Figure 2, the upper 
right-hand quadrant will become more populated with firms where institutional norms 
approach more developed country norms allowing for the development of more externalized 
capabilities and therefore more outsourcing/offshoring to occur. 
 
One may also see this study in the wider context of the offshoring of services in China 
compared with the Indian experience.  This offshored/outsourced services sector provides a 
case study epitomising the different ways in which Chinese and Indian development is 
occurring.  It is clear that the Indian offshoring services industry is more advanced than the 
Chinese sector, and is further down its life-cycle in terms of development. But it is also 
apparent that it has significant differences in terms of its orientation and evolution.  The   29
Indian market is composed of a concentrated industry with large and diversified companies 
dominating the market, fostering domestic entrepreneurs and developing management 
expertise which creates their competitive advantage.  They are export oriented and have 
developed methods of managing transactions at a distance; there is considerable expertise in 
managing these geographical costs (Dossani 2006, Qu and Brocklehurst 2003). 
 
In the Chinese market, geographical distance has not been such a big feature as most 
outsourcing is occurring mediated through client subsidiaries in China and through global 
service providers with subsidiaries in China.  This chimes in with one of the main contrasts 
that Huang and Khanna (2003) bring out: between China’s economic development 
spearheaded by foreign capital in the form of FDI and a large and wealthy diaspora which is 
warmly welcomed by the Chinese state for its money and expertise. They contrast this with 
Indian development, epitomised by the offshoring sector,  which has been based on 
domestic entrepreneurship rather than FDI and has not been welcoming of its diaspora 
which in turn has not remitted capital to India. Instead the Indian state has promoted the 
organic development of factor markets to a greater extent and has progressed further in 
developing western-style institutions in the form of a more transparent legal system, greater 
democracy, fewer legal and regulatory constraints on indigenous private firms, with a 
symbiotic relationship between these regional developments in particular states and the 
fostering of the software and offshoring sector that has flourished in those places.  
 
 By contrast in China institutional structures have remained significantly non-western and 
opaque and the form that the industry in China has taken  –  with clients and providers 
operating through FDI subsidiaries, following on from fairly lengthy association and   30
embeddedness within the Chinese economy – and operating through state-owned companies 
for particular kinds of services requiring institutional connectedness, reflects the continuing 
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Interviewee  Organisation  Place Where Interviewee Is  Interview Date 
Lilian Li  Schneider Electric  Shanghai  Dec.4th,2005 
Anonymous Ex-employee  HSBC Data Processing  Shanghai  Dec.4th,2005 
Vivan Li  Shanghai Oriental International Group  Shanghai  Dec.12th,2005 
Huang Rong  Bearing Point  Shanghai  Dec.17th,2005 
Wei Tao  Hewlett-Packard  Shanghai  Dec.20th,2005 
Vivien Wu  Bearing Point  Shanghai  Dec.27th,2005 
Anonymous Employees  Accenture  Shanghai  Jan.15th,2006 
Kaijun Ji  Motorola  Shanghai  Jan.21st,2006 
Fu Long  Bearing Point  Dalian  Jan.27th,2006 
Mr.Yu Kehao  Info  Shenzhen  Feb.20th,2006 
Ms.Yin Su  Teng  Technology  Shanghai  Feb.27th,2006 




Table 2 Case studies  
 
IT outsourcing case studies: 
Procter and Gamble to Hewlett Packard, 2003 outsourcing of IT infrastructure 
Dupont to CSC, 2003 outsourcing of call centre, desktop and server management 
China Netcom CNC to Huapu InfoTech, contract for help desk and call centre 
 
BPO Vendor case studies 
China Data Group 
PG Logistics Group 
Neusoft Park Industrial Development 
Capgemini to Dairy Farm 